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In discussions on the Middle East, people often express a need to “modernize” 
state institutions in the Muslim world. Constitutions and constitutionalism have 
often been used, mainly after WWII, to inoculate non-Western countries and ex-
colonies with this “modernity”. In the Middle East and North African (MENA) 
countries, however, this process has proven far from unproblematic, in part due 
to the troubled relations between constitutionalism and religion.  
 
This paper first introduces the concept of modernity (understood in terms of 
rationality and standardization), discussing its abrupt implementation in the 
MENA countries. Against this background, the paper goes on to address the 
effects of the colonization/decolonization process and the role that constitutions 
and constitutionalism played in this. The first modern constitutions in the newly 
established states did not only find a new state, but in many cases, 
institutionalized a new sort of dominion over the former colony. As such, the 
paper argues, in MENA countries, post-colonial constitutionalism is not 
necessarily a positive thing, but tainted by on one hand the historical 
experiences of colonialism, and on the other hand anti-Western sentiments. In 
the third section, the paper discusses the relationship between constitutionalism 
and Shari’a law, presenting this as a clash between two competing normative 
visions that are conceptually difficult to reconcile and which each claim 
exclusivity and hierarchical superiority. Finally, the conclusion advocates for a 
deconstruction of the ideas of human rights and constitutionalism in a way to 
allow for the incorporation of elements of Muslim traditions, thus challenging 
the understanding of human rights and constitutionalism as a cultural 
imposition, and as a new form of colonization. 
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1.1 MODERNITY AND  RATIONALITY 
 
Seated in the Muslim Castle of Dénia (in Valencia), watching the sea from the 
Alcaçava, I started to think about the concept of “modernity” and its relationship 
with the Muslim world. What is modernity? And, perhaps more importantly, 
what is modernity in the Muslim world? Naturally, the word “modernity”, its 
sound, meaning, dangers and consequences are not new to me; they have been 
discussed for decades now.  In one of the most influential books on modernity, 
Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer see the self-destruction of 
Western reason as grounded in a historical and fateful dialectic between the 
domination of external nature and society. They trace enlightenment, which split 
these spheres apart, back to its mythical roots. Enlightenment and myth, 
therefore, are not irreconcilable opposites, but dialectically mediated qualities of 
both real and intellectual life1.  
 
One can ask whether the diagnoses of the Frankfurt School’s members are 
applicable to the Muslim societies of the twenty-first century. It depends on 
various elements. First at all, it is hard - if not a mistake - to talk about “Muslim 
societies” or “the Muslim world” as homogeneous. Countries such as Tunisia and 
Afghanistan are completely different realities; places like Iraq and Algeria do not 
face similar conditions. Others have a much more positive understanding of 
modernity, seeing it as a beneficial and in fact inevitable process towards greater 
rationalization and technology. I guess what they have in mind is a sort of 
acultural modernism, as described by Charles Taylor.2  
Modernity necessarily implies two elements: rationalization and globalization. By 
rationalization I refer to the realm of reason and “objectivity”. By globalization I 
mean an increasing uniformity in the way of life of citizens and cultures around 
the world – people drinking Starbucks coffee in Piazza Navona in Rome, eating a 
                                                          
1 Horkheimer, Max and Adorno, Theodor (1969): Dialektik der Aufklärung, Philosophische 
Fragmente, S. Fischer Verlag, (Frankfurt am Main). See also the description of the book available 
at http://www.sup.org/book.cgi?id=1103. Last visit on 14 August 2014. 
2 Charles Taylor (1992): “Modernity and the Rise of the Public Sphere.” The Tanner Lectures on 
Human Values 14. Ed. Grethe B. Peterson. Salt Lake City: U of Utah. 
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Big Mac in Plaça Catalunya in Barcelona, or Chinese, Bolivians and Moroccans 
citizens wearing ties and checking e-mails on their new iPhones.  
 
The two components of modernity – rationality and globalization – are relevant 
when analyzing the constitutional struggles in the Middle East and the relations 
between Shari`a law and constitutionalism. Constitutions and constitutionalism 
are tools to implement legal and political rationality. Constitution is reason; legal 
reason from the top of the legal-political pyramid. Max Weber analyzed how 
formal and substantive rationality affects both theocratic and secular law; the 
particular feature that distinguishes modern secular law is its formal and logical 
rationality.3 As Weber continues, the process of rationalization progressively 
affects religious norms and beliefs. Sacred law that was implanted in different 
legal fields is displaced from these objective legal fields by reason.4 Weber’s 
work, although almost a century old (1922), still seems to be valid today when 
talking about the MENA countries, where theocratic and secular law cohabit. The 
second component, globalization, which also affects constitutional texts, 
provokes a progressive denaturalization of particular societies and ways of life. 
 
In his discussion of Islam, Weber stated that there was no single sphere of life in 
which secular law could have developed independently of the claims of sacred 
norms.5 The status of sacred law in Islam is an ideal example of the way in which 
sacred law operates in a genuinely prophetically created scriptural religion.6As 
Weber pointed out, processes of rationalization also affected the sacred law in 
Islam. But the inadequacy of the formal rationality of juridical thought made it 
impossible to have systemic lawmaking that would bring about legal uniformity 
or consistency.7 Constitutions have their own empire; they do not concede 
superior rule, only coexistence. Therefore, the conflict between a constitution 
and Shari`a law is often inevitable. It is a power conflict between different realms 
because a full separation between secular and religious spheres is not possible in 
many countries. The impediment is due to legal unification and consistency in 
Islamic law, and the fact that the Quran itself contains quite a few rules of 
positive law does not help establishing different spheres. The clash between 
constitutions (rationalized and codified secular norm) and sacred law (dispersed 
and non-rationalized) is even stronger because of different factors. First, the 
founding of a constitutional doctrine has been supported by religious language 
to consecrate undisputed legitimacy.  Both what is defined as constitutional 
                                                          
3 Weber, Max (1978): Economy and Society, University of California Press, Berkeley (Ca) p. 809 
4 Ibid. at 815. 
5 Ibid at 818 
6 Ibid 819 
7 Ibid at 821 
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theology, as well as constitutions themselves, have been affected by the 
colonization/decolonization process. I discuss this below. 
 
1.2 CONSTITUTIONAL THEOLOGY 
 
The constitution must be the highest point of the normative pyramid of laws: the 
whole system of regulations is under what we may term the constitutional 
empire. The supremacy of the constitution is essential in the legal and liberal 
system. In this perspective, modern constitutions are prescriptive texts, as are 
religious documents. As Thomas Jefferson warned, the “veneration” of the 
constitution has become a central, even if sometimes challenged, aspect of the 
American political tradition: “The flag, the Declaration and the Constitution 
constitutes the holy trinity of what Tocqueville called American civil religion”.8 
This sort of discourse warrants a non-discursive admission of the constitutional 
text by the people, and builds up, in Levinson’s terms, a constitutional faith. 
Religious discourse and methodologies tend to affect citizens’ understanding of 
the constitution to facilitate a sort of blind veneration, to treat it as a holy text.9 
What was a criticism of the religious discourse vis-à-vis the constitution can also 
be read the other way around when constitution becomes a “holy” secular text. 
 
The maxim Vox populi, vox Dei hints at a connection between the ways in which 
the Bible and the constitution are treated. As noted by Grey: “Just as Christians 
and Jews take the word of God as sovereign and the Bible as the word of God, so 
Americans take the will of the people as a sovereign, at least in secular matters, 
and the constitution as the most authoritative legal expression of the popular 
will”.10 Not only is the United States Constitution considered a holy document; 
the use of political theology continued once the draft had been deemed 
legitimate and, in fact, it has continued until the present day. The political use of 
constitutional faith has been constant, and there are many examples throughout 
the MENA history of this phenomenon. 
 
Another important consequence of the application of the means and logic of 
religious discourses to the constitutional system can be seen in the debate 
between originalism and non-originalism. The former focuses on finding the 
“original meaning” of constitutional provisions.11 For originalism, fidelity to the 
constitution requires fidelity to the original meaning of the constitutional text 
                                                          
8 Levinson, Sanford (1989): Constitutional Faith, Princeton University Press, Princeton (NJ), p. 11. 
9 Abat i Ninet, Antoni (2013): Constitutional Violence, Legitimacy, Democracy and Human Rights, 
Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh (UK), p.9. 
10 Grey, T. C (1984): “The constitution as scripture”, Stanford Law Review, 37, 1–24. 
11 Abat i Ninet, Antoni (2013): 10. 
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and to its underlying principles.12 Non-originalism is more related to the concept 
of a living constitution,13 considering the constitution to be adaptable, re-
interpreted every day according to the principles of each generation. Just like a 
sacred text, then, the constitution has its “sects”. 
 
Political theology is an old but also a very modern issue. The constitution 
(including in the MENA countries) is a civil version of the religious discourse and 
has incorporated contributions from legal normativity and legal positivism. After 
the American constitutional experience, the triumph of constitutionalism 
appears almost complete. Just about every state in the world, except for the 
United Kingdom, Israel and New Zealand, has a written constitution today. The 
MENA countries are no exception to this phenomenon. But this constitutional 
“success” has different reasons, and not all of them are unproblematic. After 
WWII, constitutionalism was a “gift” of the winners. We need only think about 
the radical influence of US General Douglas MacArthur on the Japanese 
constitution of 1947. Today, in cases such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Afghanistan or Iraq, where constitutions have been drafted and/or imposed by 
outside forces, the gradient of acculturation is even greater. 
1.3 COLONIALISM, INDEPENDENCE AND DECOLONIZATION 
 
We cannot analyze the contemporary struggles of constitutionalism in Muslim 
countries without understanding the meaning and effects of colonization, 
decolonization, independence, and the subsequent installation of authoritarian 
governments by Western powers. Constitutions and human rights are going to 
be successful only if these concepts allow a space for Islamic principles and 
practices, insofar as these – as complex and multifaceted as they are – play an 
important role in today’s Middle East. Colonization, decolonization and the 
subsequent authoritarian rule by the West, and indeed the role of the West in all 
of these events, affect the possibilities of a democratic and constitutional re-
founding of the region. As was the case with the first constitutional texts at the 
beginning of the 19th century in Latin America, the effects of colonization still 
greatly influence the MENA region’s collective sense of self. Countries such as 
Morocco, Sudan, Libya, Egypt, and Tunisia gained independence in the 1950s, 
and the damage of colonization remains vivid in the collective memories of their 
populations. In fact, such memories transcend the post-independence public 
rationale of these nations and the idea of constitutionalism is constantly 
challenged by this reality. 
 
                                                          
12 Balkin, J. M. (2007): “Original meaning and constitutional redemption”, Constitutional 
Commentary, 24(2), pp. 427–532. 
13 Ackerman, Bruce (2007): “The living constitution”, Harvard Law Review, 120, pp. 1737–93. 
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Fanon, Memmi, Sartre, Bourdieu, Césaire et al., have recounted colonization 
from the French cultural and political perspective. They may also enlighten us on 
how the human rights concept can be understood, especially if we want to 
openly confront notions of constitutionalism and democracy that differ radically 
from those in the West. As Fanon remarks, the questioning of the colonial world 
by the colonized is neither a rational confrontation of points of view nor a 
discussion on the universal; it is the unbridled assertion of an originality posed as 
absolute.14 The colonized’s own legal, religious and cultural institutions and 
traditions were considered decidedly “uncivilized.” Insult, imposition, and 
tyranny were the rule of law. Continuous economic and cultural expropriation, 
along with what can today unequivocally and justifiably be branded as grave 
breaches of human rights, were practiced with impunity until the colonies 
eventually became independent. Fanon remarked that the colonizer had a deep-
seated idea of the Arab’s “congenital barbarism,” which is what led to the 
exaltation of racialized cultural phenomena.15 
 
Most of the Arab territories were under colonial domination, and the struggle for 
national liberation was accompanied by “a cultural phenomenon known by the 
name of Islam”.16 The goal of this new movement was to ensure not so much a 
national culture as an Arab one, to counter the global condemnation brought by 
the colonizer.17 Consequently, Islam became linked not only with national 
emancipation, but also with something genuine, something fundamentally non-
Western, and because of this it became suspicious to many Westerners.  
 
The struggle of constitutionalism in the Muslim countries is intimately related to 
the multifaceted nature of Islam and the manifold political and legal positions 
taken by the different Islamic movements. In addition, the requirements of 
democracy, human rights, and liberal constitutionalism can never obviate the 
colonialism that denied human rights to human beings. As Sartre states, in the 
colonies the native was considered subhuman - the Declaration of Human Rights 
did not apply to him; he was forsaken, without protection.18 To now claim the 
application of precisely such rights can be a painful reminder of colonialism, as 
an echo of the colonizer’s values.  
 
Not only the experience of colonization has implications for the way that 
constitutionalism is addressed and understood in the MENA region; the process 
                                                          
14 Fanon, Frantz (2002): Les damnés de la terre, Éditions la Découverte/Poche, (Paris), p. 202 
15 Frantz Fanon (2002): 203. 
16 Ibid at 200. 
17 Ibid at 200. 
18 Sartre, Jean Paul (1957) in Albert Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized, Beacon Press, 
Boston (MA): xxiv. 
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of decolonization is also important here. Decolonization was not a neutral 
cleansing of all colonial elements, leaving the colonies free and independent; 
neither was it a straightforward reconstruction of the pre-colonial culture and 
society. Rather, it was the replacement of one sort of men with another species 
of men. Without transition, it was a full substitution.19 Colonization was an 
historic process that consisted of two cohabitant different and antagonistic 
forces, the colonizer and the colonized.20 To have been colonized was a fate with 
lasting, indeed grotesquely unfair, consequences, especially after national 
independence had been achieved. Poverty, dependency, underdevelopment, 
various pathologies of power and corruption, as well as notable achievements in 
war, literacy, economic development; this mix of characteristics defined the 
colonized people who had freed themselves on one level but who remained 
victims of their past on another.21 
 
Decolonization did not bring an end to colonization insofar as countries 
continued to be ruled by the reason of the colonizer. In this sense, the new rulers 
continued embracing the values, uses, and institutions of the colonizers, denying 
their own pre-colonial values. This was a consequence of the influence of the 
colonial bourgeois and elites on the new rulers during the period of liberation.22 
This influence affected the re-founding of the states; independence did not mean 
a break from colonialism. The new constitutional systems juridified Western 
values and institutions. In some cases, the colonial power did not retract with 
independence, but instead achieved an even more permanent stranglehold on 
economies and major social institutions. When the West now praises the virtues 
of modernity and rationality, these concepts have an entirely different ring to 
them in the MENA region, historically associated as they are with the reason of 
the colonizer. 
 
Today, in Western societies, colonization and decolonization seem to be 
centuries ago, but Great Britain occupied Egypt in 1882 when the country was 
legally part of the Ottoman Empire. In November 1914, after the Empire sided 
with the Central Powers, the British government declared the country (Egypt) a 
British protectorate.23 The legal form to shape the colonial occupation was the 
Protectorate, a form of governance that was later introduced in French Morocco 
                                                          
19 Frantz Fannon (2002): 41. 
20 Ibid 
21 Ahmad, Eqbal (1980): "From Potato Sack to Potato Mash: The Contemporary Crisis of the Third 
World," Arab Studies Quarterly 2 (Summer 1980): 223-34; as quoted in Edward W. Said (1987): 
“Representing the Colonized: Anthropology's Interlocutors”, Critical Inquiry, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 
205-225. 
22 Frantz Fanon (2002): 41. 
23 Botman, Selma (1991): Egypt from Independence to Revolution 1919 -1952, Syracuse 
University Press, Syracuse (NY), p. 25. 
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and Tunisia. The British declaration of a protectorate in Egypt ended four 
centuries of Ottoman sovereignty,  under which Egypt had attained a certain 
degree of autonomy since the rule of Muhammad Ali. With the occupation of 
Egypt Great Britain gained a decisive voice in all areas of Egyptian life.24  
 
The Declaration of Protectorate stated: “give notice of the state of war arising 
out of the action of Turkey, Egypt is placed under protection of his Majesty and 
will henceforth constitute a British Protectorate”.25 Behind the stated aim of 
saving and protecting the Egyptians were other non-altruistic reasons, financial 
and strategic, to establish British control of the country: Egypt is on the route to 
India; it provided control of the Suez Canal and the Nile; and it gave Britain 
geopolitical influence in the whole area, preventing the influence of France and 
Russia.26  
 
After Egyptian “independence” in 1922, the effects of British colonialism in Egypt 
continued influencing the country. The ideas of independence and constitutional 
government were supported not only by the wealthy, Europophile Egyptians of 
the Wafd political party,27 but also by Britain. As such, the de jure 
“independence” can be seen as a new form of protectorate. British influence 
after independence and decolonization was ensured; an influence that continued 
for decades. The focus on constitution-making in the post-colonial setting, as 
inherently Western imposed, tends not to exclude or reduce the effects of 
domestic processes in each constituent process, but simply to  show a pattern 
reproduced in the examples presented. 
 
Libya (a Western creation) was an Italian colony until its occupation by the Allies 
in WWII. After almost 40 years of Italian occupation of the remaining Ottoman 
North African possessions, Libya obtained its independence. The Italian invasion 
lasted until Italy’s defeat in WWII. The Italian and German evacuation of North 
Africa, matched by the advance of the Free French Forces, led to the 
establishment of a British Military Administration in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, 
as well as a French Military Administration in Fazzan after the country’s final 
conquest by the Allies in 1943.28 
                                                          
24 Ibid at 18. 
25 Declaration of the British Protectorate on December 17, 1914, London Gazette numbers 
29,010; 29,011 and 29,012. 
26 Editorial Comment (1915):“Egypt a British Protectorate” American Journal of International Law, 
pp. 202-204. See also Darwin, John (1999): “An Undeclared Empire: The British in the Middle 
East, 1918-39”, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol.27.2, 159-176. 
27 Cleveland, William L & Bunton Martin (2013): A History Modern Middle East, Westview Press, 
Philadelphia (PA), 182. 
28 Vandewalle, Dirk (2006): A History of Modern Libya, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
(UK), p.36. As the author points out, the official history of the British Military Administration can 
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Neither France nor the United Kingdom initially supported the creation of a 
united and independent Libya, and both states tried to pre-empt a United 
Nations (UN) decision supporting the new state. Both European nations signed 
the Bevin-Sforza plan, published on May 10, 1949, proposing a ten-year 
trusteeship for France in Fazzan, for Great Britain in Cyrenaica, and for Italy in 
Tripolitania.29 But after violent protests in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, it was clear 
that the Bevin-Sforza plan had served to unite the previously disparate factions 
against a common enemy.30  
 
The first Libyan constitution was drawn up in 1951 shortly before the country’s 
independence on 24 December of that year, making it an important piece on the 
Cold War chessboard because of its geographical placement. The constitutional 
form was a 1949 UN requirement; not the form of government. However, to 
avoid a veto from France of the UN Security Council’s recognition of the new 
state’s independence, the National Constituent Assembly accepted a monarchic 
form of governance, appointment of King Idrîs as-Sanoussi as its new chief of 
state, and a federal territorial form.  
 
The first article of the constitution reaffirmed the very recent unity of the three 
provinces, declaring that neither their collective sovereignty nor any part of their 
newly shared territories may be relinquished. Article 6 of the constitution 
evidenced that the text was drafted under the pressure of a deadline imposed by 
the UN. There was not even time to decide on key national symbols (the emblem 
of the state and national anthem, for example). Even the name of the country, 
The United Kingdom of Libya, was new.31 
 
Morocco was no exception to this pattern of prolonged colonial influence. During 
the period of colonization, Moroccan society was divided between a strong, 
urban Moroccan bourgeoisie on the one side, and a military, feudal and religious 
class on the other. Both managed to strengthen their economic bases during the 
protectorate period.32 These families became the main financial support base for 
the new regime. Some of the heirs of those families invested in the colonial 
system of education and became the backbone of Moroccan nationalism.33 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
be found in Lord Rennell of Rodd, British Military Administration of Occupied Territories in Africa 
during the Years 1941 -1947 (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1948). 
29Vandewalle, Dirk (2006): 39 
30 Ibid 
31 Storm, Lise (2007): Democratization in Morocco. The political elite and struggles for power in 
the post-independence state, Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics, NY (NY),  
32 Vermeren, Pierre (2006): Histoire du Maroc depuis l’indépendance, La Découverte & Syros, 
Paris, p. 13. 
33 Ibid at 14. 
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In only a few short months in 1955, the international status of Morocco changed 
from that of a “protected” state to an “independent” one. But this 
independence, agreed to by France and later Spain, did not end relations 
between the new state and the ancient metropolis. The agreements that built up 
the independence established the principle of “interdependence” with France – 
as happened with Tunisia later on – and of “cooperation” with Spain.34 In the 
case of France, the government publicized a declaration stating its will to give to 
Morocco the status of a sovereign and democratic state. This independence, 
however, was conditioned upon permanent strategic, political, diplomatic, 
economic and cultural bonds.35 We can see how democracy, at least to some 
extent, can be linked to the departed colonial power. The interdependence was 
seen by many sectors of the new state as a new form of submission to the 
former colonizer. 
 
In the case of Morocco, the main peculiarity of its process of independence was 
the role of the Sultan Sidi Mohammed Ben Youssef. The sultan, a national hero of 
the independence movement, was in charge of relations with the colonizers 
following the independence of Morocco. The sultan ruled the new nation. His 
first acts were to transform himself into a monarch (assuming the title of King 
Mohammad V in 1957) and to fulfill his commitment to the creation of a 
constitution.36  
 
The same concept of interdependence was applied in the Protocol of Agreement 
signed between France and Tunisia on March 20, 1956. The agreement 
recognized the independence of the country of the Maghreb, but also 
established a mandatory interdependence of the new state with France in 
relation to defense and external affairs.37 The relatively pacific nature of the 
Tunisian nationalist movement meant that there was no massive settler flight, 
and many Europeans decided to remain in the country after the conclusion of 
the protectorate. However, the peaceful transition of power was followed by a 
violent incident, and France wanted to punish Tunisia for supporting Algerian 
rebels.38 
 
The constitution of 1962 defined the state of Morocco as a democratic 
constitutional monarchy, mirroring several states in Europe that combined those 
                                                          
34 Laubadere André (1956): “Le statut international du Maroc depuis 1955”, Annuaire français de 
droit international, V.2, p. 122. 
35 Ibid at 124. 
36 Storm, Lise (2007): 14. See also Vermeren, Pierre (2006). 
37 Blaustein, Albert Paul; Sigler, Jay Adrian & Beede, Benjamin R (1977): Independence 
Documents of the World, Oceana Publications (NY), p. 711. 
38 Rothermund, Dietmar (2006): The Routledge Companion to Decolonization, Routledge (NY), p. 
120. 
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three elements. Other fundamental principles of the first Moroccan draft were 
the principle of national sovereignty instead of popular sovereignty, following 
the French conception (Condorcet and Sieyes). It is also remarkable that it did 
not vest de jure sovereignty in the king, but rather in the nation. According to the 
text, the Moroccan nation exercises sovereignty directly by referendum or 
indirectly through constitutional institutions(monarchy and parliament). The 
colonial situation in Tunisia was similar to other colonial situations where new 
elites challenged the colonizer; but what distinguished Tunisia from the others 
was the extent of social transformation effected by the French rule, a fact that 
evidences the intensity of the colonial experience in the country.39  
 
As Moore states, this colonial intensity was mainly a result of two elements: the 
duration of colonial rule (the French Protectorate lasted seventy-five years, from 
1881 to 1956) and the number of colonial settlers (the highest concentration of 
Europeans in the population with South Africa).40 These two aspects had a 
number of important consequences that lasted after the process of  
decolonization, among them secular jurisdiction; the most basic political 
institutions; and familiarity with the concepts of constitution and 
constitutionalism. The first Tunisian constitution was influenced by the French 
legal system and political understanding; in fact the Tunisian founding fathers 
used Jacobinism and the republican tradition to build up the sense of national 
identity and unity. 
 
The first constitution of the Republic of Tunisia has a liberal and democratic 
preamble influenced by the declaration of the rights of man and citizen of 1789 
in France. It declares that the new nation remains faithful to the human values 
that constitute the common heritage of the peoples attached to human dignity, 
justice and liberty and who are striving for peace, progress and free cooperation 
among nations. 41The preamble defines Tunisia as a democratic regime based on 
popular sovereignty and the separation of powers. It recognizes that the 
republican regime constituted the best guarantee for the respect of human 
rights and for the establishment of equality among citizens.  
In brief, the whole MENA region suffered and, in some cases, still suffers from 
the wounds of colonization. Constitutions are not only a good example to 
evidence this colonial history, but also to analyze the post-colonial influences of 
the metropolis. If we look back, only sixty years have passed since countries such 
as Morocco, Libya, Algeria, Jordan and Syria gained their independence; and 
                                                          
39 Moore, Clement Henry (1965): Tunisia since Independence. The Dynamics of One-Party 
Government, University of California Press, Berkeley, p.15. 
40 Ibid at 16. 
41 See the preamble of the constitution of Tunisia 2014. 
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these processes came after the protectorates, economic privileges and other 
facilities that the ancient metropolis maintained.  
 
It is paradoxical that Western countries claim to support human rights 
implementation in the MENA region,  yet at the same time have supported many 
of the leaders suppressing those rights. France, for example, enjoyed a close 
relationship with Tunisia’s former president, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. As late as 
2008, for instance, then French president Nicolas Sarkozy declared on a visit to 
Tunis that the space for freedom was expanding.42 Similarly, despite then US 
president George W. Bush warning Tunisia in 2008 that the country must 
improve its human rights record, later, US defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld 
described Tunisia as a “successful country,” citing its ability to create an 
“environment that is hospitable to investment, enterprise and to opportunity for 
their people.”43  
 
It is also well known that former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak was 
considered a pillar of regional stability by the major Western powers. Mubarak 
was long Washington’s man in Cairo: he kept open the Suez Canal, repressed the 
Islamists and maintained peace with Israel. In return, the United States provided 
for Egypt, contributing billions in economic assistance to build up the country’s 
infrastructure, agricultural technology, and public health programs.44 France’s 
relationship with Mubarak’s regime came under fire when then prime minister 
François Fillon admitted that he had enjoyed a holiday paid for by Mubarak’s 
government.45 Fillon’s admission brought further embarrassment to the French 
government, which was already embroiled in a row over the revelation that 
Michèle Alliot-Marie, the foreign minister, had used a hospitality jet on a 
Tunisian Christmas holiday.46 
 
Relations with many of the now-former dictatorships in the Arab world were not 
completely cut off after the Arab Spring. Indeed, Britain has allowed key 
members of Egypt’s toppled dictatorship to retain millions of pounds of 
suspected property and business assets in the United Kingdom, potentially in 
                                                          
42 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/17/tunisian-protests-sarkozy-off-guard Last 
access on August 14, 2014. 
43 Financial Times, “France regrets misjudgement over Ali”, Roula Khalaf and Scheherazade 
Daneshkhu, January 18,2011. Available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/68bef0c2-232a-11e0-
b6a3-00144feab49a.html#axzz2OYcVXwds Last access on March 25, 2013.  
44 Steven A Cook, “The U.S. - Egyptian Breakup”, Foreign Affairs, February 2, 2011.  
45 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-12397397 
46 Adam Sage, “Sarkozy hit by turbulence on  ‘Air Mubarak’ free trip”, The Times, February 9, 
2011, available at http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/europe/article2904245.ece  (Last 
access March 25, 2013). 
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violation of existing international agreements.47 In December 2007, then French 
president Nicolas Sarkozy welcomed Gaddafi to Paris and insisted to a French 
newspaper that “Gaddafi is not perceived as a dictator in the Arab world. He is 
the longest serving head of state in the region.” The United Kingdom also had 
close ties with Gaddafi’s Libya. The former prime minister, Tony Blair, helped 
draw Libya out of international isolation and become a close ally with the United 
Kingdom in the Global War on Terror. This cozy relationship extended to the 
military as well: Blair had pushed to increase arms sales to Libya as recently as 
2006.48 
 
 
                                                          
47 Jack Shenker, “Scandal of Mubarak regime millions in UK”, The Guardian, September, 2, 2012, 
available at: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/sep/02/scandal-mubarak-regime-millions-assets-uk 
(Last access on March 26, 2013) 
48 William Lee Adams, “The other Special relationship: documents reveal cozy ties between 
Britain and Gaddafi”, The Times, September, 6 2011. Available at: 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2092008,00.html (Last accessed on March 25, 
2013) 
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For over a millennium, Shari'a law provided the social, institutional, and judicial 
structure for the Arab world, as well as the underlying ethical codes and moral 
views binding this structure together.49 Shari'a law also involved a complex and 
sophisticated system in which the jurists were educators and forged a multi-
layered set of relations that at times created political truth and ideology.50 While 
there were often disagreements as to how to interpret Shari'a law, most often 
the ulema seemed to be in a strong position to determine how the holy text was 
to be interpreted. At this point, it is necessary to remark that the relative 
autonomy that ulema and kadis used to have as political authorities in pre-
modern societies is not true anymore, and this fact changed not only the 
independence of these communities of legal students of Islam and Shari’a, but 
also the content of the interpretations and understandings of the Islamic law. 
 
The law of Shari'a does not distinguish between religious and secular life but 
arbitrates in both spheres, including formal criminal punishments and judicial 
matters as well as acts of worship and family life. Muslims are expected to accept 
the Quran as the word of God, but this is not the unique source of law. Shari'a 
law also appears as the regulator of society and daily life.  There are different 
sources and tools to be used for interpretation such as (Professor I don’t suggest 
you accept my crude attempts to render these complex and subtle concepts, but 
only that it would perhaps be helpful and more inclusive for the reader if there 
were some interpretative English phrases at this point, even though you deal 
with some of the concepts in more detail later - AS) ijtihad (independent 
reasoning), urf (custom), taqlid (deference to scholarship) and hadith (reports of 
the Prophet’s teachings). This system of interpretation, together with the great 
historical, cultural, social, political, and economic differences between Muslim 
countries, makes for very different interpretations of Shari'a law. Shari'a law is 
not “simply” a law in the modern sense of the word, but is also a moral and 
religious system with implications for other spheres of life.  
 
                                                          
49 Hallaq B. Wael (2009): An Introduction to Islamic Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
(UK), p. 163. 
50 Ibid. 
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Shari'a law relied on a cognitive approach to the facts; an intellectual 
engagement to comprehend all the possible ways of thinking and interpretation 
pertaining to a particular case.51 It was not the case that was of primary 
importance, but rather the principle that governed a group of cognate cases. The 
law was a heuristic project, not “a body of rules of action or conduct prescribed 
by (a) controlling authority”.52 The religious law was the intellectual work of 
private individuals, jurists whose claim to authority was based primarily on 
erudition, legal knowledge, and religious and moral distinction, rather than a 
“solemn expression of the will of the supreme power of the state”.53 This nature 
of Shari'a gave it a high degree of acceptance and respect among citizens. But 
the multiple effects and fields of application of these religious compendia of 
moral,  ethical, legal, and political rules collided with the rules of the state. 
A major difference between the modern notion of law and Shari'a law is that the 
religious law did not apply equally to all, for individuals were not seen as 
indistinguishable members of a generic species, standing in perfect parity before 
law, but instead as believers.54 As such, equality before the law – a fundamental 
premise of democratic states of law and a common requirement of liberal 
constitutions – is not fulfilled. This conceptual contraposition between modern 
law and Shari'a law seems to drastically reduce the possibility of establishing a 
workable system of cohabitation, since the antinomy can affect the principle of 
equality. It might be that Shari'a is not concerned with secular notions of 
equality, but it is accountable for all members of society including non-Muslims. 
 
This difference also explains why Islamic thinkers never accepted the concept of 
blind justice; another source of collision between modern law and Shari’a. In 
Shari’a law, each individual and circumstance was deemed unique, requiring 
context-specific ijtihad (a classical methodology for interpreting Shari'a 
consisting of making a decision independently of any school of jurisprudence).55 
More than a law, Shari'a was a juristic guide that directed the judge and all legal 
personnel on the ground to resolve a situation in due consideration of the 
unique facts involved therein.56  
 
                                                          
51 Ibid at 166 
52 Ibid 
53 Ibid 
54 Ibid. We focus our attention on the Islamic law and its relation with the constitutional system 
and public law. We exclude the legal religious dispositions concerning the personal status 
aspects. To analyze the personal regulations and principles of Shari’a see March, Andrew F 
(2009): Islam and Liberal Citizenship: The Search for an Overlapping Consensus, Oxford University 
Press. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Hallaq Wael B. (2009): 167. 
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An old method of interpretation of religious provisions was the taqlid, which 
consisted of reasoning from the four “sources” of law instead of reasoning from 
precedent.57 As such, there was  common acceptance of the fact that there 
would be, at any one time, several contending interpretations of Islamic law, and 
Muslims came to follow different interpretations, or schools, under the 
supervision of different guilds of jurists.58 This shows that Muslims historically 
were used to dealing with competing and equally orthodox versions; an 
experience that could be useful when dealing with the new competitor that also 
claims superiority, the secular constitution.  
 
Another problem when seeking to combine Shari'a principles with secular 
constitutionalism is the abstract character of the universal principles in both sets 
of norms. The abstraction, as is the case with constitutional principles, must be 
overcome by interpretation. In Western constitutional systems, the role of the 
negative legislator, the constitutional control, is developed diffusely by the 
judiciary in common law systems, and by the Schmittian Hüter der Verfassung in 
continental systems. In civil law systems, the courts are specialized in law, and 
the interpretation is based on jurisprudence and the bloc de constitutionnalité. 
Who is going to interpret Shari'a law dispositions in Arab post-revolution 
Supreme Constitutional Courts?  
 
Some authors have focused primarily on arguing for the compatibility between 
democracy and Islam. This discourse is manifested in Egypt by the jurisprudence 
of the Egyptian Supreme Court, the Muslim Brotherhood, and significant legal 
scholars like Abdel Razzaq al-Sanhuri, Tariq el-Bishri, Khaled Abou El Fadl and 
Tariq Ramadan. In Tunisia it comes from the political movement Ennahda, legal 
scholars Radwan A. Masmoudi, the political leader and founder of the Islamist 
Party Rached Al-Ghannouchi, and Nader Hashemi; and in Morocco, from 
Mohamed Najib Bouli and Malika Zeghal.59 But the compatibility between Islam 
and democracy is one thing; the compatibility of Islamic law and 
constitutionalism is a slightly different matter. Are Islamic law and 
constitutionalism compatible – or can they become compatible? This question is 
different because it affects different items and it has different repercussions. Can 
the modern sovereign and its juridification share its power and legitimacy with 
another power, with a divine one? Can we share the rule of the people, certainly 
                                                          
57 Lombardi Clark B & Brown Nathan J: (2006): “Do Constitutions Requiring Adherence to Shari’a 
Threaten Human Rights? How Egypt’s Constitutional Court Reconciles Islamic Law with Liberal 
Rule of Law”, American University International Law Review. 403. 
58 Ibid 
59 Lombardi Clark B & Brown Nathan J: (2006): 379. On Morocco see 
http://www.leparisien.fr/flash-actualite-monde/islam-et-democratie-sont-compatibles-les-
responsables-arabes-veulent-rassurer-davos-26-01-2012-1830902.php . See also, Mezghani, Ali 
(2011):L'État inachevé: La question du droit dans les pays arabes, Gallimard, Paris (France). 
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divinized in the modern secular countries, with the rule of God? Who rules in 
case of contradiction – the constitution or Shari'a law? The conceptual 
confrontation between the Shari'a and the constitutional empire is served.  
 
The solution has been to constitutionalize Shari'a law and its universal principles, 
to establish the religious law as a primary source for legislation and 
interpretation.60 This is the model used in the Egyptian constitution, where 
Article 2 declares Shari'a law as the main source of legislation. 
People arguing for compatibility have sought to resolve this tension in different 
ways, either by interpreting popular sovereignty as popular power under 
constitutional constraints, or by interpreting divine sovereignty as including 
popular sovereignty. It is people who are entrusted with interpreting and 
applying God’s commands when they tend to be vague and indeterminate.61  
 
The debates that took place in Israel in 1948 between democracy (ethnic or not) 
and theocracy, and between constitution (written or not) and Shari'a law, are 
now reproduced in Tunisia and Egypt. It seems paradoxical to understand 
democracy as a step towards theocracy, but arguably that was the goal of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, which won a democratic election to install a theocracy. 
Having said that, the compatibility between a liberal constitution and Shari'a law, 
which was defended by the Egyptian Constitutional Supreme Court, is now 
challenged with the approval of the new constitutional text. As Sultany remarks, 
the question is whether non-religious constitutional drafters consider yielding to 
religious demands to enact Shari'a principles and dispositions within the 
constitutional structure, and if Shari’a law’s ambiguity can be used as a reason to 
move towards a more liberal, secular, rights protection.62  
 
Former Egyptian president Morsi’s constitutional declaration of November 22, 
2012, putting its resolutions and the Constituent Assembly over law and also 
limiting their prosecution to “sovereign affairs”, seems to point to the fact that 
the country was to follow a path toward an authoritarian regime. On November 
27, 2012 thousands of people demonstrated against his attempt to expand his 
powers. The protesters argued that the constituent power dominated by the 
Islamists would limit some of the basic rights in Egypt, introducing a theocracy 
that would subordinate the constitution to Shari’a law.  
 
                                                          
60 Lombardi Clark B. (1998 -1999):“Islamic Law as a Source of Constitutional Law in Egypt: The 
Constitutionalization of the Sharia in a Modern Arab State”, 37 Colum J. Transnat’l L. 81. See also 
Meital, Yoram (2006): “The Struggle over Political Order in Egypt: The 2005 Elections, 60 (2) 
Middle East J. Vol. 257. 
61 Feldam Noah, (2003): After Jihad: America and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy, Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, NY; 19. 
62 Ibid at 39. 
 21 
As Hirschl argues, his concept of constitutional theocracies is incompatible with 
radical conceptions of democracy,63 but also with the concept of 
constitutionalism. Certainly, no constitutional democracy is purely democratic, 
but a constitutional democracy must respect at least some basic characters to be 
considered as such. Does the ruling of the Shari'a assure the observance of law? 
Probably, but there is no separation of powers at all, no checks or balances; 
there is only a sort indisputable legitimacy, the holy and unique one. Hirschl’s 
aim to incentivize constitutionalism in theocracies is admirable, but legitimacy 
cannot be built based on the “problems of liberal constitutionalism”. 
Furthermore, no liberal constitutions are to blame for the economic, legal, and 
social inequalities listed by the author to seek the legitimacy of a new version of 
religious constitutionalism.  
 
Democratic elections have occurred recently in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, and the 
constitutional processes have been more or less turbulent in each. However, in 
all these scenarios, Shari'a law plays an important role within the legal system, at 
times balancing the scales towards democracy, at times theocracy. As we have 
said above, the cohabitation of the two has been challenged, but it is more than 
that – it is in danger. In Tunisia, the dominant Islamist Ennahda party wants to 
make the personal status code stronger, banning polygamy and granting Tunisian 
women unequaled rights.64 The fears were basically grounded in the position 
that the Islamist party has taken in the constituent debate, remarking the 
necessity to mention Shari'a law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
63Hirschl, Ran (2010): Constitutional Theocracy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Ma), p. 42. 
64 Alston Philip and Goodman Ryan (2013): International Human Rights, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, (UK): 7. 
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The possibilities of constitutionalism depend not on modernity, but on an Islamic 
version of constitutionalism. I do not know if Shari'a law clauses, Al Azhar, Sunni 
references, and other religious contents are the solution to attenuate the clash 
between the two emperors – religion and constitution. The paradox is that at the 
beginning of modern constitutionalism, the constitutions used religious speech 
to achieve legitimacy and pseudo-divinity. Now, it might be the other way 
around. Not only the constitution, but also religion is struggling in the MENA 
countries. The debates on the role of Shari'a law, the need to accommodate 
concrete words in the constitutional text, and the necessity to declare Islam as 
the official religion of the country are all evidence of this. Perhaps it is now 
religion that needs constitutionalism more than constitutionalism needs religion. 
This overturn is the best symptom of modernity and can be considered the first 
step towards a deconstruction of what is called “Islamic constitutionalism” with 
the aim to reconcile Islam and constitutionalism.  
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